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C a u c a s u s
VL AD I M I R  B O B R O V N I K O V
The discourse on re-enacting Islamic law in the post-
Soviet North Caucasus uses key terms such as sharia
courts, highland Muslim traditions, and Islamic in-
surgency. What seems important here is to shed light
on these notions by answering such questions as: To
what extent do these terms reflect the post-Soviet
legal reality or diverge from it? What can be said of
the sharia mythology shared by both adherents and
opponents of re-Islamization in the North Caucasus?
What is the historical background of discourse on
sharia courts?
M y t h o l o g i z i n g
Sharia Courts
in the Post-Soviet
North Caucasus
Public debates on and attempts at introduc-
ing Islamic law have become characteristic
of post-Soviet Muslim and non-Muslim
areas, and are especially vivid in the North
Caucasus. In recent years, the so-called
Ôsharia courtsÕ or mahakim sharÕiya were es-
tablished de facto by reopened mosques in
a number of villages and towns in Dagestan,
Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia-Alania,
Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-
Balkaria. The majority of mosques are locat-
ed in Northern Dagestan and Southern
Chechnya. They settle small inheritance and
criminal cases including divorce, theft,
drinking alcoholic beverages, and the like.
The decisions of these courts are final and
not subject to appeal. They usually impose
both fixed sharia and non-Islamic penalties.
Dagestani chairmen of village and district
administrations often call upon local q a d i s
to settle family and land trials.
Articles 212 and 235 of the Soviet criminal
code of the Russian Federation prohibiting
the application of sharia norms regarding
marriage and inheritance practices were
abolished in its new version passed in 1996.
But sharia courts have not been legalized in
post-Soviet Russia with the exception of
Chechnya and Ingushetia. In December
1997 the Ingush president Ruslan Aushev
enacted mediating judges who are to follow
Ôthe a d a t (i.e. local customary law) and sharia
normsÕ while settling criminal and civil
cases. Sharia norms relating to marriage
(z a w a j) and feuding (q i s a s) were legalized in
the republic in 1996-1999. The Chechen Re-
public of Ichkeria officially proclaimed itself
an independent Islamic State in 1996. The
preamble of the Chechen Constitution was
amended such that it then read: ÔQuran and
sharia are the principal source of legislationÕ.
In September 1996, acting president Ze-
limkhan Yandarbiyev brought into force the
new criminal code copied from the 1983
sharia criminal code of Sudan. The Supreme
Sharia Court and corresponding district in-
stitutions were created. Public punishments
with fixed penalties (h u d u d) were intro-
duced for selling alcoholic beverages, illegal
sexual intercourse and severe criminal of-
fences like robbery and homicide. In reality,
few death sentences and corporal punish-
ments sentenced by Chechen sharia courts
have been applied to date.
Sharia and state-building
As soon as the first death sentence of the
Supreme Sharia Court of Chechnya was
given in Grozny in April 1997, vigorous de-
bates on sharia began in the North Cau-
casian and Moscow media. One can identify
two competing attitudes towards this issue.
The majority of Muslim clergy are in favour
of introducing Islamic law, regarded as the
tool of national liberation and social mod-
ernization. They consider sharia as the
magic solution to the problem of growing
criminality and social instability caused by
the collapse of Soviet rule.
It is amazing, that many Moscow journalists
and academic scholars, quite unfamiliar with
Islam, also support re-enacting the sharia
law in the North Caucasus. They believe that
it is the only means to maintain order and to
prevent Chechnya and neighbouring Cau-
casian republics from anarchy. As a former
member of the Soviet Union Communist
Party Central Committee and now political
scientist, A.S. Tsipko, put it: ÔLetÕs take a
sober view of things. The sharia laws pro-
tecting the Chechens from self-degradation
are much more progressive than other laws
and culture (i.e. neo-liberal) stipulating self-
destruction of the peopleÕ. This view is wide-
spread among Moscow intellectuals. A jour-
nalist, A. Fedin, expressed it as follows: ÔThe
Chechen society is still mainly pre-state and
traditional. It is based on the unwritten cus-
tomary law [É] Public executions sentenced
by the sharia court appear to be the begin-
ning of the state-building of Chechnya,
which is to be an inevitably bloody affairÕ.
Opposing views
There is also an opposite notion of sharia
as Õa barbarous remnant of the middle agesÕ
The distinct flavour of this view was
captured by Seyyid-Muhammad
Abubakarov, the former Dagestani
Mufti, in an interview with ÔIzvestiaÕ just
before his assassination in August 1998:
ÕDo you remember the recent execution
of the death sentence imposed by the
sharia court in Chechnya? And such
trouble and harrowing reminiscences
made of it? Even those who had agreed
with this sentence hesitated, their souls
having been disgusted. But letÕs think of
a quite another thing. The problem is
what we should do with those who deal
in kidnapping and trade the captured,
turned into living goods, or with those
who kill their victims and sell their
cadavers. I consider sharia court as a
preventive measure against new
murders, not as a pure cruelty. Today a
criminal knows that his case will be
arranged, decided in his favour, that
punishment is not inevitable. According
to sharia, his responsibility is full Ð thus it
is a good preventive measure, isnÕt it?Õ
that Ôjudges brutality in the Chechen man-
nerÕ associated with public flogging, cutting
off of hands, throwing stones, and therefore
quite unsuited for the modern law and soci-
ety. This view is shared by the top-level offi-
cials in the Russian Federal government such
as K.M. Tsagolov, a deputy to a former minis-
ter of nationalities of the Russian Federation,
and the majority of the pro-Moscow Cau-
casian authorities. They accuse adherents of
the sharia courts of working for Chechen ter-
rorists. Part of the Moscow mass media sid-
ing with the PutinÕs government propagated
such a negative vision of ÔShariatistsÕ. As an-
other minister of the Russian Federation, Ra-
mazan Abdulatipov, pointed in August 1999:
ÔAgainst a background of the war in Dages-
tan and the aggravated situation in the
North Caucasus, an impression has been
spread in Russia that every Muslim is an Is-
lamic extremistÕ.
Paradoxically, both of these antagonistic
visions of sharia have a somewhat common
core. The first striking thing is the almost
total absence of knowledge of Islamic law
among the majority of adherents and oppo-
nents of re-enacting Islamic courts. In their
view sharia is reduced to some elementary
norms of criminal and family law. No one can
distinguish the S h a f ici t e legal school, tradi-
tionally dominant on the territory of Dages-
tan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, from the
Hanafi one prevailing among the other Cau-
casian and Russian Muslims. Due to such ig-
norance, the Chechen authorities adopted
the Sudanese sharia code based on the Ma-
likite m a d h h a b. The majority of participants
in the debates are unable to judge numer-
ous deviations from the classic Islamic doc-
trine as they were attested in the work of re-
enacted sharia courts in the last decade.
It is noteworthy that no Muslim judges or
even academic legal theoreticians specializ-
ing in Islamic law take part in this public de-
bate. Its participants are mainly journalists,
politicians and academic scholars including
political scientists, historians and anthropol-
ogists. The only exception is Prof. L.R.
Syukiyaynen from the Institute of State and
Law in Moscow. Syukiyaynen is RussiaÕs lead-
ing expert on Islamic law, although his opin-
ion is uncommon and much more realistic.
While recognizing the great advantages of
sharia in resolving social problems and in re-
laxing local tensions in present-day North
Caucasus, he argues that there has not yet
been adequate application of Islamic law in
this region.
Myth-making about the sharia is charac-
teristic of both opposing sides of the debate.
The concepts of both are more or less di-
vorced from reality. ÔHighland Muslim tradi-
tionalismÕ is seen as the key to the nature of
the North Caucasian law and society. This
notion does not take into account the radical
social and legal changes that have been in-
evitably caused by drastic state reforms in
this region for more than a century (from the
1860s); the mass resettlement of Muslim
highlanders to the plain; and even forcible
deportation of entire groups that took place
under the Soviet rule. Moreover, the authors
cited above completely ignored the fact that
the criminal laws of the sharia were not ap-
plied in the pre-modern Caucasus. Histori-
cally, highlanders settled criminal cases in
accordance with their customary laws or im-
posed state legislation.
Another myth typical of the discourse on
sharia courts is the vision of Islamic law as a
natural antagonist of the Russian state. Par-
ticipants of these debates argue that in the
past sharia played a significant role in the
political resistance of the North Caucasian
highlanders, first to the Russian conquest
and later to the Soviet reforms. From this,
they conclude that restored sharia courts
must undermine Russian rule in the present
day Caucasus. This mythology has a long his-
tory, embedded in the colonial policy of late
Imperial Russia, which considered Islamic
law unfavourable. After the Caucasian war of
the 19t h century, the possibility of Islamic
uprisings haunted the mind of top-level
state officials such as S.M. Dukhovsky, Gover-
nor-General of the Turkestan Province, or
K.P. Pobedonostsev, Procurator-General of
the Saint Synod. This fear lead the state to re-
strict the use of sharia norms for the Russian
Muslims and to keep Muslim clergy of the
North Caucasus under tight control. In turn,
Muslim political opposition arose at the end
of the 19t h century, constantly reclaiming
the full application of the sharia law.
This mythology had much influenced legal
and social development of the North Cau-
casian Muslims in the 20t h century. First, it
led to the introduction of sharia courts after
the Revolution of 1917 and the collapse of
the Russian empire. These courts were en-
acted by revolutionary decrees passed by
the First Congress of the Highland Peoples
of the Caucasus and that of the Terek peo-
ples held in 1917-1918. They worked under
different political rules including the early
Soviet one and were abolished only by 1925-
1927. For the second time, the idea of ÔIslam-
ic resurgenceÕ was realized in the North Cau-
casus following the break-up of the Soviet
Union. Sharia courts were introduced here
again. But the social and legal situation in
the region had completely changed.
One should take into account that re-Is-
lamization emerged in a context of, and in
reaction to, the Soviet legacy. It presents a
specific modern answer to challenges origi-
nating from the collapse of the Soviet rule in
the Caucasus. Now the myth of sharia is em-
bodied in the post-Soviet flesh and is
fraught with all its negative effects due to
the degradation of Islamic legal culture and
growing criminalization of power and soci-
ety in the region. '
M u h a m m a d -
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